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ABSTRACT
This paper studies model-inversion attacks, in which the access to a model is abused to infer
information about the training data. Since its first introduction by Fredrikson et al. [2014], such attacks
have raised serious concerns given that training data usually contain privacy sensitive information.
Thus far, successful model-inversion attacks have only been demonstrated on simple models, such as
linear regression and logistic regression. Previous attempts to invert neural networks, even the ones
with simple architectures, have failed to produce convincing results. Here we present a novel attack
method, termed the generative model-inversion attack, which can invert deep neural networks with
high success rates. Rather than reconstructing private training data from scratch, we leverage partial
public information, which can be very generic, to learn a distributional prior via generative adversarial
networks (GANs) and use it to guide the inversion process. Moreover, we theoretically prove that
a model’s predictive power and its vulnerability to inversion attacks are indeed two sides of the
same coin—highly predictive models are able to establish a strong correlation between features and
labels, which coincides exactly with what an adversary exploits to mount the attacks. Our extensive
experiments demonstrate that the proposed attack improves identification accuracy over the existing
work by about 75% for reconstructing face images from a state-of-the-art face recognition classifier.
We also show that differential privacy, in its canonical form, is of little avail to defend against our
attacks.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been adopted in a wide range of applications, including computer vision, speech
recognition, healthcare, among others. The fact that many compelling applications of DNNs involve processing sensitive
and proprietary datasets raised great concerns about privacy. In particular, when machine learning (ML) algorithms are
applied to private training data, the resulting models may unintentionally leak information about training data through
their output (i.e., black-box attack) or their parameters (i.e., white-box attack).
A concrete example of privacy attacks is model-inversion (MI) attacks, which aim to reconstruct sensitive features
of training data by taking advantage of their correlation with the model output. Algorithmically, MI attacks are
implemented as an optimization problem seeking for the sensitive feature value that achieves the maximum likelihood
under the target model. The first MI attack was proposed in the context of genomic privacy [Fredrikson et al., 2014],
where the authors showed that adversarial access to a linear regression model for personalized medicine can be abused
to infer private genomic attributes about individuals in the training dataset. Recent work [Fredrikson et al., 2015]
extended MI attacks to other settings, e.g., recovering an image of a person from a face recognition model given just
their name, and other target models, e.g., logistic regression and decision trees.
∗Both authors contributed equally
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
07
13
5v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  1
7 N
ov
 20
19
Figure 1: Reconstruction of the individual on the left by attacking three face recognition models (logistic regression,
one-hidden-layer and two-hidden-layer neural network) using the existing attack algorithm in [Fredrikson et al., 2015]
Thus far, effective MI attacks have only been demonstrated on the aforementioned simple models. It remains an open
question whether it is possible to launch the attacks against a DNN and reconstruct its private training data. The
challenges of inverting DNNs arise from the intractability and ill-posedness of the underlying attack optimization
problem. For neural networks, even the ones with one hidden layer, the corresponding attack optimization becomes a
non-convex problem; solving it via gradient descent methods may easily stuck in local minima, which leads to poor
attack performance. Moreover, in the attack scenarios where the target model is a DNN (e.g., attacking face recognition
models), the sensitive features (face images) to be recovered often lie in a high-dimensional, continuous data space.
Directly optimizing over the high-dimensional space without any constraints may generate unrealistic features lacking
semantic information. (See Figure 1).
In this paper, we focus on image data and propose a simple yet effective attack method, termed the generative model-
inversion (GMI) attack, which can invert DNNs and synthesize private training data with high fidelity. The key
observation supporting our approach is that it is arguably easy to obtain information about the general data distribution,
especially for the image case. For example, against a face recognition classifier, the adversary could randomly crawl
facial images from the Internet without knowing the private training data. We find these datasets, although may not
contain the target individuals, still provide rich knowledge about how a face image might be structured; extraction and
proper formulation of such prior knowledge will help regularize the originally ill-posed inversion problem. We also
move beyond specific attack algorithms and explore the fundamental reasons for a model’s susceptibility to inversion
attacks. We show that the vulnerability is unavoidable for highly predictive models, since these models are able to
establish a strong correlation between features and labels, which coincides exactly with what an adversary exploits to
mount MI attacks.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows: (1) We propose to use generative models to learn an informative
prior from public datasets so as to regularize the ill-posed inversion problem. (2) We propose an end-to-end GMI
attack algorithm based on GANs, which can reveal private training data of DNNs with high fidelity. (3) We present a
theoretical result that uncovers the fundamental connection between a model’s predictive power and its susceptibility to
general MI attacks and empirically validate it. (4) We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate the performance of
the proposed attack. (5) We show that differential privacy, a “gold standard” privacy notion nowadays, is of little avail
to protect against our attacks, because it does not explicitly aim to protect the secrecy of attributes in training data. This
raises the question: What is the right notion for attribute privacy? Answering this question is an important future work.
2 Related Work
Privacy attacks against ML models consist of methods that aim to reveal some aspects of training data. Of particular
interest are membership attacks and MI attacks. Membership attacks aim to determine whether a given individual’s
data is used in training the model [Shokri et al., 2017]. MI attacks, on the other hand, aim to reconstruct the features
corresponding to specific target labels.
In parallel to the emergence of various privacy attack methods, there is a line work that formalizes the privacy notion
and develops defenses with formal and provable privacy guarantees. One dominate definition of privacy is differential
privacy (DP), which carefully randomizes an algorithm so that its output does not to depend too much on any individuals’
data [Dwork et al., 2014]. In the context of ML algorithms, DP guarantees protect against attempts to infer whether
a data record is included in the training set from the trained model [Abadi et al., 2016]. By definition, DP limits the
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Figure 2: Overview of the proposed GMI attack method.
success rate of membership attacks. However, it does not explicitly protect attribute privacy, which is the target of MI
attacks [Fredrikson et al., 2014].
The first MI attack was demonstrated in [Fredrikson et al., 2014], where the authors presented an algorithm to recover
genetic markers given the linear regression that uses them as input features, the response of the model, as well as other
non-sensitive features of the input. Hidano et al. [2017] proposed a algorithm that allows MI attacks to be carried out
without the knowledge of non-sensitive features by poisoning training data properly. Despite the generality of the
algorithmic frameworks proposed in the above two papers, the evaluation of the attacks is only limited to linear models.
Fredrikson et al. [2015] discussed the application of MI attacks to more complex models including some shallow neural
networks in the context of face recognition. Although the attack can reconstruct face images with identification rates
much higher than random guessing, the recovered faces are indeed blurry and hardly recognizable. Moreover, the
quality of reconstruction tends to degrade for more complex architectures. Yang et al. [2019b] proposed to train a
separate network that swaps the input and output of the target network to perform MI attacks. The inversion model can
be trained with black-box accesses to the target model. However, their approach cannot directly be benefited from the
white-box setting.
Moreover, several recent papers started to formalize MI attacks and study the factors that affect a model’s vulnerability
from a theoretical viewpoint. For instance, Wu et al. [2016] characterized model invertibility for Boolean functions
using the concept of influence from Boolean analysis; Yeom et al. [2018] formalized the risk that the model poses
specifically to individuals in the training data and shows that the risk increases with the degree of overfitting of the
model. However, their theory assumed that the adversary has access to the join distribution of private feature and label,
which is overly strong for many attack scenarios. Our theory does not rely on this assumption and better supports the
experimental findings.
3 Generative MI Attack
An overview of our GMI attack is illustrated in Figure 2. In this section, we will first discuss the threat model and then
present our attack method in details.
3.1 Threat Model
In traditional MI attacks, an adversary, given a model trained to predict specific labels, uses it to make predictions of
sensitive features used during training. Throughout the paper, we will refer to the model subject to attacks as the target
network. We will focus on the white-box setting, where the adversary is assumed to have access to the target network f
and employs some inference technique to discover the features x associated with a specific label y. In addition to f , the
adversary may also have access to some auxiliary knowledge that facilitates his inference. We will use face recognition
classifiers as a running example for the target network. Face recognition classifiers label an image containing a face
with an identifier corresponding to the individual depicted in the image. The corresponding attack goal is to recover the
face image for some specific identity based on the target classifier parameters.
3
Possible Auxiliary Knowledge. Examples of auxiliary knowledge could be a corrupted image which only contains
nonsenstive information, such as background pixels in a face image, or a blurred one. This auxiliary knowledge might be
easy to obtain, as blurring and corruption are often applied to protect anonymity of individuals in public datasets [Carrell
et al., 2012, Li et al., 2019].
Connection to Image Inpainting. The setup of MI attacks on images resembles the widely studied image inpainting
tasks in computer vision, which also try to fill missing pixels of an image. The difference is, however, in the goal of the
two. MI attacks try to fill the sensitive features associated with a specific identity in the training set. In contrast, image
inpainting tasks only aim to synthesize visually realistic and semantically plausible pixels for the missing regions;
whether the synthesized pixels are consistent with a specific identity is beyond the scope. Despite the difference, our
approach to MI attacks leverages some training strategies from the venerable line of work on image inpainting [Yeh
et al., 2017, Iizuka et al., 2017, Yang et al., 2019a] and significantly improves the realism of the reconstructed images
over the existing attack methods.
3.2 Inferring Missing Sensitive Features
To realistically reconstruct missing sensitive regions in an image, our approach utilizes the generator G and the
discriminator D, all of which are trained with public data. After training, we aim to find the latent vector zˆ that achieves
highest likelihood under the target network while being constrained to the data manifold learned by G. However, if not
properly designed, the generator may not allow the target network to easily distinguish between different latent vectors.
For instance, in extreme cases, if the generated images of all latent vectors collapse to the same point in the feature
space of the target network, then there is no hope to identify which one is more likely to appear in its private training set
of the target network. To address this issue, we present a simple yet effective loss term to promote the diversity of the
data manifold learned by G when projected to the target network’s feature space.
Specifically, our reconstruction process consists of two stages: (1) Public knowledge distillation, in which we train the
generator and the discriminators on public datasets in order to encourage the generator to generate realistic-looking
images. The public datasets can be unlabeled and have no identity overlapping with the private dataset. (2) Secret
revelation, in which we make use of the generator obtained from the first stage and solve an optimization problem to
recover the missing sensitive regions in an image.
For the first stage, we leverage the canonical Wasserstein-GAN [Arjovsky et al., 2017] training loss:
min
G
max
D
Lwgan(G,D) = Ex[D(x)]− Ez[D(G(z))] (1)
When the auxiliary knowledge (e.g., blurred or corrupted version of the private image) is available to the attacker,
we let the generator take the auxiliary knowledge as an additional input. Moreover, when the extra knowledge is a
corrupted image, we adopt two discriminators for discerning whether an image is real or artificial, like [Iizuka et al.,
2017]. The global discriminator looks at the reconstructed image to assess if it is coherent as a whole, while the local
discriminator looks only at a randomly selected patch containing the mask boundary to ensure the local consistency of
the generated patches at the boundary area. However, different from [Iizuka et al., 2017] which fuses the outputs of the
two discriminators together by a concatenation layer that predicts a value corresponding to the probability of the image
being real, we allow two discriminators to have separate outputs, as we find it make the training loss converge faster
empirically. The detailed architecture of the GAN is presented in the supplementary material.
In addition, inspired by [Yang et al., 2019a], we introduce a diversity loss term that promotes the diversity of the images
synthesized by G when projected to the target network’s feature space. Let F denote the feature extractor of the target
network. The diversity loss can thus be expressed as
max
G
Ldiv(G) = Ez1,z2
[‖F (G(z1))− F (G(z2))‖
‖z1 − z2‖
]
(2)
As discussed above, larger diversity will facilitate the targeted network to discern the generated image that is most
likely to appear in its private training set. Our full objective for public knowledge distillation can be written as
minGmaxD Lwgan(G,D)− λdLdiv(G).
In the secret revelation stage, we solve the following optimization to find the latent vector that generates an image
achieving the maximum likelihood under the target network while remaining realistic: zˆ = argminz Lprior(z)+λiLid(z),
where the prior loss Lprior(z) penalizes unrealistic images and the identity loss Lid(z) encourages the generated images
to have high likelihood under the targeted network. They are defined, respectively, by
Lprior(z) = −D(G(z)) Lid(z) = − log[C(G(z))] (3)
where C(G(z)) represents the probability of G(z) output by the target network.
4
4 Connection Between Model Predictive Power and MI Attacks
For a fixed data point (x, y), we can measure the performance of a model f for predicting the label y of feature x
using the log likelihood log pf (y|x). It is known that maximizing the log likelihood is equivalent to minimizing the
cross entropy loss—one of the most commonly used loss functions for training DNNs. Thus, throughout the following
analysis, we will focus on the log likelihood as a model performance measure.
Now, suppose that (X,Y ) is drawn from an unknown data distribution p(X,Y ). Moreover, X = (Xs, Xns), where Xs
and Xns denote the sensitive and non-sensitive part of the feature, respectively. We can define the predictive power
of the sensitive feature Xs under the model f (or equivalently, the predictive power of model f using Xs) as the
change of model performance when excluding it from the input, i.e., E(X,Y )∼p(X,Y )[log pf (Y |Xs, Xns)−pf (Y |Xns)].
Similarly, we define the predictive power of the sensitive feature given a specific class y and nonsensitive feature xns as
Uf (xns, y) = EXs∼p(Xs|y,xns)[logpf (y|Xs, xns)− logPf (y|xns)] (4)
We now consider the measure for the MI attack performance. Recall the goal of the adversary is to guess the value
of xs given its corresponding label y, the model f , and some auxiliary knowledge xns. The best attack outcome
is the recovery of the entire posterior distribution of the sensitive feature, i.e., p(Xs|y, xns). However, due to the
incompleteness of the information available to the adversary, the best possible attack result that adversary can achieve
under the attack model can be captured by pf (Xs|y, xns) ∝ pf (y|Xs, xns)p(Xs|xns), assuming that the adversary can
have a fairly good estimate of p(Xs|xns). Such estimate can be obtained by, for example, learning from public datasets
using the method in Section 3.2. Although MI attack algorithms often output a single feature vector as the attack
result, these algorithms can be adapted to output a feature distribution instead of a single point by randomizing the
starting guess of the feature. Thus, it is natural to measure the MI attack performance in terms of the similarity between
p(Xs|y, xns) and pf (Xs|y, xns). The next theorem indicates that the vulnerability to MI attacks is unavoidable if the
sensitive features are highly predictive under the model. When stating the theorem, we use the negative KL-divergence
SKL(·||·) to measure the similarity between two distributions.
Theorem 1. Let f1 and f2 be two models such that for any fixed label y ∈ Y , Uf1(xns, y) ≥ Uf2(xns, y). Then,
SKL(p(Xs|y, xns)||pf1(Xs|y, xns)) ≥ SKL(p(Xs|y, xns)||pf2(Xs|y, xns)).
We omit the proof of the theorem to the supplementary material. Intuitively, highly predictive models are able to build a
strong correlation between features and labels, which coincides exactly with what an adversary exploits to launch MI
attacks; hence, more predictive power inevitably leads to higher attack performance.
In [Yeom et al., 2018], it is argued that a model is more vulnerable to MI attacks if it overfits data to a greater degree.
Their result is seemingly contradictory with ours, because fixing the training performance, more overfitting implies that
the model has less predictive power. However, the assumption underlying their result is fundamentally different from
ours, which leads to the disparities. The result in [Yeom et al., 2018] assumes that the adversary has access to the joint
distribution p(Xs, Xns, Y ) that the private training data is drawn from and their setup of the goal of the MI attack is to
learn the sensitive feature associated with a given label in a specific training dataset. By contrast, our formulation of MI
attacks is to learn about private feature distribution p(Xs|y, xns) for a given label y from the model parameters. We do
not assume that the adversary has the prior knowledge of p(Xs, Xns, Y ), as it is a overly strong assumption for our
formulation—the adversary can easily obtain p(Xs|y, xns) for any labels and any values of non-sensitive features when
having access to the joint distribution.
5 Experiments
5.1 Experimental Setup
Dataset. We evalaute our method using three datasets: (1) the MNIST handwritten digit data (MNIST), (2) the Chest
X-ray Database [Wang et al., 2017] (ChestX-ray8), and (3) the CelebFaces Attributes Dataset (CelebA) containing
202,599 face images of 10,177 identities with coarse alignment. We crop the images at the center and resize them to
64×64 so as to remove most background.
Protocol. We split each dataset into two disjoint parts: one part used as the private dataset to train the target network
and the other as a public dataset for prior knowledge distillation. The public data, throughout the experiments, do
not have class intersection with the private training data of the target network. Therefore, the public dataset in our
experiment only helps the adversary to gain knowledge about features generic to all classes and does not provide
information about private, class-specific features for training the target network. This ensures the fairness of the
comparison with the existing MI attack [Fredrikson et al., 2015].
5
Models. We implement several different target networks with varied complexities. Some of the networks are adapted
from existing ones by adjusting the number of outputs of their last fully connected layer to our tasks. For the
digit classification on MNIST, our target network consists of 3 convolutional layers and 2 pooling layers. For the
disease prediction on ChestX-ray8, we use ResNet-18 adapted from [He et al., 2015]. For the face recognition
tasks on CelebA, we use the following networks: (1) VGG16 adapted from [Simonyan and Zisserman, 2014]; (2)
ResNet-152 adapted from [He et al., 2015]; (3) face.eoLVe adapted from the state-of-the-art face recognition
network [Cheng et al., 2017].
Training. We split the private dataset defined above into training set (90%) and test set (10%) and use the SGD
optimizer with learning rate 10−2, batch size 64, momentum 0.9 and weight decay 10−4 to train these networks. To
train the GAN in the first stage of our attack pipeline, we set λd = 0.5 and use the Adam optimizer with the learning
rate 0.004, batch size 64, β1 = 0.5, and β2 = 0.999 [Kingma and Ba, 2014]. In the second stage, we set λi = 100 and
use the SGD optimizer to optimize the latent vector z with the learning rate 0.01, batch size 64 and momentum 0.9. z is
drawn from a zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian distribution. We randomly initialize z for 5 times and optimize each
round for 1500 iterations. We choose the solution with the lowest identity loss as our final latent vector.
5.2 Evaluation Metrics
Evaluating the success of MI attacks requires to assess whether the recovered image exposes the private information
about a target label. Previous works analyzed the attack performance mainly qualitatively by visual inspection. Herein,
we introduce four metrics which allow for quantitatively assessing the MI attack efficacy and performing evaluation at a
large scale.
Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR). PSNR is the ratio of an image’s maximum squared pixel fluctuation over the
mean squared error between the target image and the reconstructed image [Hore and Ziou, 2010]. PSNR measures the
pixel-wise similarity between two images. The higher the PSNR, the better the quality of the reconstructed image.
However, oftentimes, the reconstructed image may still reveal identity information even though it is not close to the
target image pixel-wise. For instance, a recovered face with different translation, scale and rotation from the target
image will still incur privacy loss. This necessitates the need for the following metrics that can evaluate the similarity
between the reconstructed and the target image at a semantic level.
Attack Accuracy (Attack Acc). We build an evaluation classifier that predicts the identity based on the input
reconstructed image. If the evaluation classifier achieves high accuracy, the reconstructed image is considered to expose
private information about the target label. The evaluation classifier should be different from the target network because
the reconstructed images may incorporate features that overfit the target network while being semantically meaningless.
Moreover, the evaluation classifier should be highly performant. For the reasons above, we adopt the state-of-the-art
architecture in each task as the evaluation classifier. For MNIST, our evaluation network consists of 5 convolutional
layers and 2 pooling layers. For ChestX-ray8, our evaluation network is adapted from VGG-19 [Simonyan and
Zisserman, 2014]. For CeleA, we use the model in [Cheng et al., 2017] as the evaluation classifier. We first pretrain it
on the MS-Celeb-1M [Guo et al., 2016] and then fine tune on the identities in the training set of the target network.
The resulting evaluation classifier can achieve 96% accuracy on these identities.
Feature Distance (Feat Dist). Feat Dist measures the l2 feature distance between the reconstructed image and the
centroid of the target class. The feature space is taken to be the output of the penultimate layer of the evaluation network.
K-Nearest Neighbor Distance (KNN Dist). KNN Dist looks at the shortest distance from the reconstructed image to
the target class. We identify the closest data point to the reconstructed image in the training set and output their distance.
The distance is measured by the l2 distance between the two points in the feature space of the evaluation classifier.
5.3 Experimental Results
We compare our proposed GMI attack with the existing model-inversion attack (EMI), which implements the algorithm
in [Fredrikson et al., 2015]. In this algorithm, the adversary only exploits the identity loss for image reconstruction
and returns the pixel values that minimize the the identity loss. In the attack scenario where the attacker has access to
auxiliary knowledge, such as blurred or corrupted image, we compare our method with an additional baseline—pure
image inpainting (PII). PII minimizes the W-GAN loss and performs image recovery based purely on the information
completely from the public dataset. The comparison with PII will indicate whether our attack truly reveals private
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Target Masked EMI PII GMI
(c) Center Mask (d) Face T Mask
Target Masked EMI PII GMITarget Blurred EMI PII GMI
(b) Blurring(a) W/out auxiliary knowledge
Target EMI GMIPII
Figure 3: Qualitative comparison of the proposed GMI attack with the existing MI attack (EMI). When the attacker has
access to blurred or corrupted private images as auxiliary knowledge, we additionally compare with the pure image
inpainting method (PII). The ground truth target image is shown in 1st col.
information or merely learns to output a realistic-looking image. The network architectures for PII are exhibited in the
the supplementary material.
5.3.1 Attacking Face Recognition Classifiers
For CelebA, the private set comprises 21,152 images of 1000 identities and samples from the rest are used as a public
dataset. We evaluate the attack performance in the three settings: (1) the attacker does not have any auxiliary knowledge
about the private image, in which case he will recover the image from scratch; (2) the attacker has access to a blurred
version of the private image and his goal is to deblur the image; (3) the attacker has access to a corrupted version of the
private image wherein the sensitive, identity-revealing features (e.g., nose, mouth, etc) are blocked.
Table 1 compares the performance of our proposed GMI attack against EMI and PII for different network architectures.
We can see that EMI can hardly attack deep nets and achieves around zero attack accuracy. Since EMI does not exploit
any prior information, the inversion optimization problem is extremely ill-posed and performing gradient descent ends
up at some visually meaningless local minimum, as illustrated by Figure 3. Interestingly, despite having the meaningless
patterns, these images can all be classified correctly into the target label by the target network. Hence, the existing MI
attack tends to generate “adversarial examples” that can fool the target network but does not exhibit any recognizable
features of the private data. GMI is much more effective than EMI. Particularly, our method improves the accuracy of
the attack against the state-of-the-art face.evoLVe classifier over EMI by 75% in terms of Top-5 attack accuracy.
Also, note that models that are more sophisticated and have more predictive power are more susceptible to attacks. We
will examine this phenomenon in more details in Section 5.3.3.
Figure 3 also compares GMI with PII, which synthesizes a face image completely based on the information from the
public dataset. We can see that although PII leads to realistic recoveries, the reconstructed images do not present the
same identity features as the target images. This can be further corroborated by the quantitative results in Table 1.
Table 1: Comparison of GMI with EMI and PII, when the attacker does not have any auxiliary knowledge about the
target image.
Model Attack KNN Dist Feat Dist Attack Acc Top-5 Attack Acc
VGG16
EMI 2397.50 2255.54 0 0
PII 2368.77 2425.09 0 0
GMI 2098.92 2012.10 28 53
ResNet-152
EMI 2422.99 2288.13 0 1
PII 2368.77 2425.09 0 0
GMI 1969.09 1886.44 44 72
face.evolve
EMI 2371.52 2248.81 0 1
PII 2368.77 2425.09 0 0
GMI 1923.72 1802.62 46 76
We now discuss the case where the attacker has access to some auxilliary knowledge in terms of blurred or partially
blocked images. For the latter, we consider two types of masks—center and face “T”, illustrated by the second
column of Figure 3 (c) and (d), respectively. The center mask blocks the central part of the face and hides most of the
identity-revealing features, such as eyes and nose, while the face T mask is designed to obstruct all private features
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in a face image. EMI takes into account the auxiliary knowledge by using it as a starting point to optimize identity
loss. GMI and PII add another branch in the generator to take the auxiliary knowledge as an extra input; the detailed
architectures can be found in the supplementary material. Table 2 shows that our method consistently outperforms
EMI and PII. In particular, the comparison between GMI and PII indicates that the improved attack performance of
GMI over EMI is not merely due to the realistic recovery—it truly reveals private information from the target networks.
Moreover, the attacks are more effective for the center mask than the face T mask. This is because the face T mask we
designed completely hides the identity revealing features on the face while the center mask may still expose the mouth
information.
Table 2: Comparison of GMI with EMI and PII, when the attacker can access blurred and corrupted private images.
Model Metric Blurring Center Mask Face T maskEMI PII GMI EMI PII GMI EMI PII GMI
VGG16
PSNR 19.66 20.78 21.97 18.69 25.49 27.58 19.77 24.05 26.79
Feat Dist 2073.56 2042.99 1904.56 1651.72 1866.07 1379.26 1798.85 1838.31 1655.35
KNN Dist 2164.40 2109.82 1946.97 1871.21 1772.74 1414.37 1980.68 1916.67 1742.74
Attack Acc 0% 6% 43% 14% 34% 78% 11% 20% 58%
ResNet-152
PSNR 19.63 20.78 22.00 18.69 25.49 27.34 19.89 24.05 26.64
Feat Dist 2006.46 2042.99 1899.79 1635.03 1866.07 1375.36 1641.31 1838.31 1594.81
KNN Dist 2101.13 2109.82 1922.14 1859.78 1772.74 1403.24 1847.74 1916.67 1670.05
Attack Acc 1% 6% 50% 9% 34% 80% 11% 20% 63%
face.evoLVe
PSNR 19.64 20.78 22.04 18.97 25.49 27.69 19.86 24.05 25.77
Feat Dist 1997.93 2042.99 1878.38 1609.35 1866.07 1364.42 1762.57 1838.31 1624.95
KNN Dist 2085.53 2109.82 1904.47 1824.10 1772.74 1403.19 1962.07 1916.67 1682.56
Attack Acc 1% 6% 51% 12% 34% 82% 11% 20% 64%
Moreover, we examine the performance of the proposed attack for recovering some implicit attributes of the private
images, such as gender, age, hair style, among others. For some attributes in CelebA, the number of individuals with
the attribute is significantly different from that without the attribute. It will be very easy to achieve a high accuracy
for recovering these attributes as the attacker can just always output the majority. Therefore, we only focus on some
private-sensitive attributes for which CelebA is roughly balanced. Table 3 shows that GMI also outperforms EMI in
terms of recovering the attributes in various attack settings.
Table 3: Comparison of GMI with EMI and PII for recovering implicit attributes of the private images. The attack
performance is measured by the accuracy (%) of a classifier trained to detect a specific attribute in a face image.
Setting Attack BlondHair
Bushy
Eyebrows Glasses Male Mustache Young
W/out
Aux.
Knowledge
EMI 55 65 63 47 74 51
PII 64 65 78 51 70 61
GMI 78 76 90 74 88 70
Center
Mask
EMI 70 44 67 78 75 84
PII 76 56 79 75 77 84
GMI 94 79 94 95 92 97
Face T
Mask
EMI 74 44 55 73 69 77
PII 80 47 82 70 71 73
GMI 89 71 95 86 90 94
Blurring
EMI 77 67 56 67 75 57
PII 76 70 77 71 76 65
GMI 86 84 92 90 85 82
5.3.2 Impact of Public Knowledge
We have seen that distilling prior knowledge and properly incorporating it into the attack algorithm are important to the
success of MI attacks. In our proposed method, the prior knowledge is gleaned from public datasets through GAN. We
now evaluate the impact of public datasets on the attack performance.
We first consider the case where the public data is from the same distribution as the private data and study how the size
of the public data affects the attack performance. We change the size ratio (1:1, 1:4, 1:6, 1:10) of the public over the
8
private data by varying the number of identities in the public dataset (1000, 250, 160, 100). As shown in Table 4, the
attack performance varies by less than 7% when shrinking the public data size by 10 times.
Table 4: Evaluation for the impact of public datasets on the attack accuracy.
Model CelebA→CelebA PubFig83→CelebA EMI1:1 1:4 1:6 1:10 W/o Preproc. W/ Preproc.
VGG 78% 77% 75% 72% 48% 67% 14%
LeNet 81% 75% 77% 75% 52% 66% 9%
face.evoLVe 77% 77% 77% 70% 56% 70% 12%
Moreover, we study the effect of the distribution shift between the public and private data on the attack performance.
We train the GAN on the PubFig83 dataset, which contains 13,600 images with 83 identities, and attack the target
network trained on CelebA. There are more faces with sunglasses in PubFig83 than CelebA, which makes it harder
to distill generic face information. Without any pre-processing, the attack accuracy drops by more than 20% despite
still outperforming the existing MI attack by a large margin. To further improve the reconstruction quality, we detect
landmarks in the face images, rotate the images such that the eyes lie on a horizontal line, and crop the faces to remove
the background. These pre-processing steps make the public datasets better present the face information, thus improving
the attack accuracy significantly.
5.3.3 Attacking Models with Varied Predictive Powers
We perform experiments to validate the connection between predictive power and the vulnerability to MI attacks. We
measure the predictive power of sensitive feature under a model using the difference of model testing accuracy based
on all features and just non-sensitive features. We consider the following different ways to construct models with
increasing feature predictive powers, namely, enlarging the training size per class, adding dropout regularization, and
performing batch normalization. For the sake of efficiency, we slightly modify the proposed method in Section 3.2 in
order to avert re-training GANs for different architectures. Specifically, we exclude the diversity loss from the attack
pipeline so that multiple architectures can share the same GAN for prior knowledge distillation. Figure 4 shows that, in
general, the attack performance will be better for models with higher feature predictive powers. Moreover, this trend is
consistent across different architectures.
(a) (b) (d)(c)
Figure 4: (a)-(c): The performance of the GMI attack against models with different predictive powers by varying
training size, dropout, and batch normalization, respectively. (d) Attack accuracy of the GMI attack against models with
different DP budgets. Attack accuracy of PII is plotted as a baseline.
5.3.4 Attacking Differentially Private Models
We investigate the implications of DP for MI attacks. (, δ)-DP is ensured by adding Gaussian noise to clipped gradients
in each training iteration [Abadi et al., 2016]. We find it challenging to produce useful face recognition models with
DP guarantees due to the complexity of the task. Therefore, we turn to a simpler dataset, MNIST, which is commonly
used in differential private ML studies. We set δ = 10−5 and vary the noise scale to obtain target networks with
different . The detailed settings of differentially private training are presented in the supplementary material. The attack
performance against these target networks and their utility are illustrated in Figure 4 (d). Since the attack accuracy of
the GMI attack on differentially private models is higher than that of PII which fills missing regions completely based
on the public data, it is clear that the GMI attack can expose private information from differentially private models, even
with stringent privacy guarantees, like  = 0.1. Moreover, varying differential privacy budgets helps little to protect
against the GMI attack; sometimes, more privacy budgets even improve the attack performance (e.g., changing  from 1
to 0.1). This is because DP, in its canonical form, only hides the presence of a single instance in the training set; it does
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not explicitly aim to protect attribute privacy. Limiting the learning of specific individuals may facilitate the learning of
generic features of a class, which, in turn, helps to stage MI attacks.
5.3.5 Results on Other Datasets
For MNIST, we use all 34265 images with labels 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 as private set, and the rest of 35725 images with labels
0, 1, 2, 3, 4 as a public dataset. Note that the labels in the private and public data have no overlaps. We augment the
public data by training an autoencoder and interpolating in the latent space. Our GMI attack is compared with EMI in
Table 5. We omit the PII baseline because the public and private set defined in this experiment are rather disparate and
PII essentially produces results close to random guesses. We can see from the table that the performance of GMI is
significantly better than the EMI.
Moreover, we attack a disease predictor trained on ChestX-ray8. We use 10000 images of seven classes as the
private data and the other 10000 of different labels as public data. The GMI and EMI attack are compared in Table 5.
Again, the GMI attack outperforms the EMI attack by a large margin.
Table 5: Comparing the GMI against the EMI attack on MNIST and ChestX-ray8.
Dataset Attack KNN Dist Feat Dist Attack Acc
MNIST EMI 31.60 82.69 40%GMI 4.04 16.17 80%
ChestX-ray8 EMI 130.19 155.65 14%GMI 63.42 93.68 71%
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a generative approach to MI attacks, which can achieve the-state-of-the-art success rates
for attacking the DNNs with high-dimensional input data. The idea of our approach is to extract generic knowledge
from public datasets via GAN and use it to regularize the inversion problem. Our experimental results show that our
proposed attack is highly performant even when the public datasets (1) do not include the identities that the adversary
aims to recover, (2) are unlabeled, (3) have small sizes, (4) come from a different distribution from the private data.
We also provide theoretical analysis showing the fundamental connection between a model’s predictive power and its
vulnerability to inversion attacks. For future work, we are interested in extending the attack to the black-box setting and
studying effective defenses against MI attacks.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 2. Let f1 and f2 are two models such that for any fixed label y ∈ Y , Uf1(xns, y) ≥ Uf2(xns, y). Then,
SKL(p(Xs|y, xns)||pf1(Xs|y, xns)) ≥ SKL(p(Xs|y, xns)||pf2(Xs|y, xns)).
Proof. We can expand the KL divergence DKL(p(Xs|y, xns)||pf1(Xs|y, xns) as follows.
DKL(p(Xs|y, xns)||pf1(Xs|y, xns)) (5)
= EX∼p(Xs|y,xns)[log p(Xs|y, xns)]− EX∼p(Xs|y,xns)[log pf1(Xs|y, xns)] (6)
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Thus,
DKL(p(Xs|y, xns)||pf1(Xs|y, xns))−DKL(p(Xs|y, xns)||pf2(Xs|y, xns)) (7)
= EX∼p(Xs|y,xns)[log pf2(Xs|y, xns)− log pf1(Xs|y, xns)] (8)
=
∑
x
p(Xs|y, xns)
(
log
pf2(y|Xs, xns)p(Xs|xns)
pf2(y|xns)
− log pf1(y|Xs, xns)p(Xs|xns)
pf1(y|xns)
)
(9)
=
∑
x
p(Xs|y, xns)
((
log pf2(y|Xs, xns)− log pf2(y|xns)
)
− ( log pf1(y|Xs, xns)− log pf1(y|xns))) (10)
= Uf2(xns, y)− Uf1(xns, y) ≤ 0 (11)
B Experimental Details
B.1 Network Architecture
The GAN architectures for the GMI attacks without auxiliary knowledge, with corrupted private image, and with
blurred private image, are shown in Figure 5, 6, and 7, respectively. Moreover, in the experiments, we use the same
GAN architectures for the PII baseline and the GMI attacks.
Result
Latent Vector
Global Discriminator
Generator
Figure 5: The GAN architecture for the attack without auxiliary knowledge.
The detailed architecture designs of the two encoders, the decoder of the generator, the local discriminator, and the
global discriminator are presented in Table 6, Table 7, Table 8, Table 9, and Table 10, respectively.
Table 6: When the auxiliary knowledge is a corrupted private image, the upper encoder of the generator takes as input
the corrputed RGB image and the binary mask. When the auxiliary knowledge is a blurred private image, the upper
encoder only takes an image as input.
Type Kernel Dilation Stride Outputs
conv. 5x5 1 1x1 32
conv. 3x3 1 2x2 64
conv. 3x3 1 1x1 128
conv. 3x3 1 2x2 128
conv. 3x3 1 1x1 128
conv. 3x3 1 1x1 128
conv. 3x3 2 1x1 128
conv. 3x3 4 1x1 128
conv. 3x3 8 1x1 128
conv. 3x3 16 1x1 128
The information of some network architectures used in the experiment section but not covered in the main text is
elaborated as follows: (1) LeNet adapted from [Lecun et al., 1998], which has three convolutional layers, two max
pooling layers and one FC layer; (2) SimpleCNN, which has five convolutional layers, each followed by a batch
normalization layer and a leaky ReLU layer; (3) SoftmaxNet, which has only one FC layer.
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Corrupted Image Mask
Concat
Latent Vector
Dilated Conv.
Local Discriminator
Global Discriminator
Generator
Result
Figure 6: The GAN architecture for the attack with the auxiliary knowledge of a corrupted private image.
Concat
Latent Vector
Dilated Conv.
Global Discriminator
Blurred Image Generator
Result
Figure 7: The GAN architecture for the attack with the auxiliary knowledge of a blurred private image.
Table 7: The lower encoder of the generator that takes as input the latent vector.
Type Kernel Stride Outputs
linear 8192
deconv. 5x5 1/2 x 1/2 256
deconv. 5x5 1/2 x 1/2 128
Table 8: The decoder of the generator.
Type Kernel Stride Outputs
deconv. 5x5 1/2 x 1/2 128
deconv. 5x5 1/2 x 1/2 64
conv. 3x3 1x1 32
conv. 3x3 1x1 3
Table 9: The global discriminator.
Type Kernel Stride Outputs
conv. 5x5 2x2 64
conv. 5x5 2x2 128
conv. 5x5 2x2 256
conv. 5x5 2x2 512
conv. 1x1 4x4 1
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Table 10: The local discriminator. This discriminator only appears in the attack with the knowledge of a corrupted
image.
Type Kernel Stride Outputs
conv. 5x5 2x2 64
conv. 5x5 2x2 128
conv. 5x5 2x2 256
conv. 1x1 4x4 1
B.2 The Detailed Setting of the Experiments on “Attacking Differentially Private Models”
We split the MNIST dataset into the private set used for training target networks with digits 0 ∼ 4 and the public set
used for distilling prior knowledge with digits 5 ∼ 9. The target network is implemented as a Multilayer Perceptron
with 2 hidden layers, which have 512 and 256 neurons, respectively. The evaluation classifier is a convulutional neural
network with three convolution layers, followed by two fully-connected layers. It is trained on the entire MNIST
training set and can achieve 99.2% accuracy on the MNIST test set.
Differential privacy of target networks is guaranteed by adding Gaussian noise to each stochastic gradient descent
step. We use the moment accounting technique to keep track of the privacy budget spent during training [Abadi et al.,
2016]. During the training of the target networks, we set the batch size to be 256. We fix the number of epochs
to be 40 and clip the L2 norm of per-sample gradient to be bounded by 1.5. We set the ratio between the noise
scale and the gradient clipping threshold to be 0, 0.694, 0.92, 3, 28, respectively, to obtain the target networks with
ε =∞, 9.89, 4.94, 0.98, 0.10 when δ = 10−5. For model with ε = 0.1, we use the SGD with a small learning rate 0.01
to ensure stable convergence; otherwise, we set the learning rate to be 0.1.
The architecture of the generator in Section B.1 is tailored to the MNIST dataset. We reduce the number of input
channels, change the size of kernels, and modify the layers of discriminators to be compatible with the shape of the
MNIST data. To train the GAN in the first stage of our GMI attack, we set the batch size to be 64 and use the Adam
optimizer with the learning rate 0.004, β1 = 0.5, and β2 = 0.999 [Kingma and Ba, 2014]. For the second stage, we set
the batch size to be 64 and use the SGD with the Nesterov momentum that has the learning rate 0.01 and momentum
0.9. The optimization is performed for 3000 iterations.
The center mask depicted in the main text is used to block the central part of digits. We report the attack accuracy
averaged across 640 randomly sampled images from the private set and 5 random initializations of the latent vector for
each sampled image.
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